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8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
9 **DISTRICT OF NEVADA**  
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11 CHARLES KEOHOKALOLE, )

12 Petitioner, )

13 vs. )

14 WARDEN WILLIAMS, et al, )

15 Respondents. )  
16 \_\_\_\_\_/

2: 10-CV-0859-KJD-LRL

**ORDER**

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18 This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which  
19 petitioner, a state prisoner, is proceeding *pro se*. The court finds that none of the grounds for relief  
20 set forth in the petition have been exhausted in state court and that the petition must therefore be  
21 dismissed.

22 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), at 28 U.S.C. §  
23 2254(d), provides the legal standard for the Court’s consideration of this habeas petition:

24 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a  
25 person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be  
26 granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in  
State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

1 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as  
2 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

3 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable  
4 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the  
5 State court proceeding.

6 The AEDPA “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner  
7 applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court convictions are  
8 given effect to the extent possible under law.” *Bell v. Cone*, 535 U.S. 685, 693-694 (2002). A state  
9 court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28  
10 U.S.C. § 2254, “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the  
11 Supreme Court’s] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially  
12 indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result  
13 different from [the Supreme Court’s] precedent.” *Lockyer v. Andrade*, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)  
14 (quoting *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000) and citing *Bell v. Cone*, 535 U.S. 685,  
694 (2002)).

15 A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme  
16 Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), “if the state court identifies the correct  
17 governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that  
18 principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” *Lockyer v. Andrade*, 538 U.S. at 75 (quoting *Williams*,  
19 529 U.S. at 413). The “unreasonable application” clause requires the state court decision to be more  
20 than merely incorrect or erroneous; the state court’s application of clearly established federal law  
21 must be objectively unreasonable. *Id.* (quoting *Williams*, 529 U.S. at 409).

22 A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his  
23 conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. §  
24 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court  
25 the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. *Coleman v.*  
26 *Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); *Rose v. Lundy*, 455 U.S. 509, 518,

1 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); *Buffalo v. Sunn*, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1988).

2 A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state  
3 court with “a full and fair opportunity to consider and resolve the federal claims.” *Sandgate v.*  
4 *Maass*, 314 F.3d 371, 371 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002), *citing* *Duncan v. Henry*, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887,  
5 888 (1995) A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity  
6 to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal  
7 basis. *Duncan v. Henry*, 513 U.S. at 365, 115 S.Ct. at 888 (legal basis); *Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes*,  
8 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner must have  
9 specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. *Duncan*, 513 U.S.  
10 at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; *Keating v. Hood*, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.1998).

11 In the present case, petitioner explains in his petition that none of his grounds for  
12 relief have been presented to the state courts. Because the petition contains no exhausted claims, the  
13 court lacks jurisdiction and is obliged to dismiss the federal petition immediately. *See, Jiminez v.*  
14 *Rice*, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.2001), *cert. denied*, 538 U.S. 949 (2003); *Raspberry v. Garcia*, 448  
15 F.3d 1150 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006).

16 **IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** that this petition for writ of habeas corpus is  
17 **DISMISSED** without prejudice to petitioner’s right to file a new petition after he has exhausted his  
18 state court remedies. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and to close  
19 this case.

20 DATED: July 19, 2010



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22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  
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